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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
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)
)
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)
)
v.
)
)
JAMEE LEE RICHARDSON,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
______________________________)

NO. 45974
ADA COUNTY NO. CR01-17-42602

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Jamee Lee Richardson pled guilty to one count of felony grand theft by possession of
stolen property.

She received a unified sentence of fourteen years, with two years fixed.

Ms. Richardson contends that her sentence represents an abuse of the district court’s discretion,
as it is excessive given any view of the facts.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On October 2, 2017, a woman reported that her purse had been stolen out of her car while
it was parked at a park.

(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI),1 p.3.)

The

woman’s stolen credit card was used to make purchases at Walgreens totaling $521. (PSI, p.3.)
The Walgreens surveillance video showed a female identified as Jamee Richardson using the
credit card to purchase gift cards. (PSI, pp.3-4.)
Ms. Richardson was charged by Information with felony grand theft by possessing stolen
property and grand theft by unauthorized control. (R., pp.22-23.) Pursuant to a plea agreement,
Ms. Richardson pled guilty to felony grand theft by possession of stolen property. (1/5/18
Tr., p.6, Ls.12-24; p.10, L.25 – p.11, L.2; R., pp.45-53.) According to the terms of the plea
agreement, the State agreed to dismiss grand theft by unauthorized control and to not file a
persistent violator sentencing enhancement. (1/5/18 Tr., p.6, Ls.12-24; R., p.52.) The district
court accepted Ms. Richardson’s guilty plea, ordered a PSI, and set the matter for sentencing.
(1/5/18 Tr., p.11, Ls.3-13.)
At sentencing, the State recommended a sentence of fourteen years, with four years fixed.
(3/2/18 Tr., p.8, Ls.16-22.) Ms. Richardson’s counsel recommended ten years of probation, with
one year either in jail or in the custody of the Idaho Department of Correction. (3/2/18 Tr., p.15,
L.22 – p.17, L.21.) The district court sentenced Ms. Richardson to fourteen years, with two
years fixed. (3/2/18 Tr., p.24, L.23 – p.25, L.6; R., pp.58-61.)
Ms. Richardson appeals from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.63-65.)
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Appellant’s use of the designation “PSI” includes the packet of documents grouped with the
electronic copy of the PSI, including the PSI and evaluations.
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ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Ms. Richardson to a unified sentence
of fourteen years, with two years fixed, following her plea of guilty to felony grand theft?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Ms. Richardson To A
Unified Sentence Of Fourteen Years, With Two Years Fixed, Following Her Plea Of Guilty To
Felony Grand Theft
Ms. Richardson asserts that, given any view of the facts, her unified sentence of fourteen
years, with two years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court
imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review
of the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and
the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence.’” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
573, 577 (1979)). Ms. Richardson does not allege that her sentence exceeds the statutory
maximum.

Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Ms. Richardson must show

that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the
facts. Id. The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of
society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
In light of Ms. Richardson’s rehabilitative potential, the district court abused its
discretion in sentencing her excessively. The district court failed to consider the fact that
Ms. Richardson suffers from mental illness as well as addictions to heroin and prescription pain
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medications, and was truly remorseful. Ms. Richardson has substantial support and is motivated
to stay sober for the sake of her children. (PSI, p.27.) With programming, Ms. Richardson could
likely be successful in the community.
Ms. Richardson had four children. (PSI, p.11.) Unfortunately, her eldest child suddenly
passed away in 2015, when he was only fifteen-years-old, due to a heart condition. (PSI, pp.11,
13.) The death of her child caused Ms. Richardson’s mental health to deteriorate and her relapse
on controlled substances. (3/2/18 Tr., p.13, Ls.1-10; PSI, pp.13-14.) She values her family and
one of her goals is to strengthen her relationship with her children and to be a good mother to
them. (PSI, pp.10, 15-16.) See State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594-595 (1982) (reducing
sentence of defendant who had the support of his family and employer in his rehabilitation
efforts); see also State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988) (reducing sentence of
first-time offender who had a family depending upon him for support and who accepted
responsibility for the offense at issue), overruled on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295 (1990).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that substance abuse should be considered as a
mitigating factor by the district court when that court imposes sentence. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho
89 (1982). In Nice, the Idaho Supreme Court reduced a sentence based on Nice’s lack of prior
record and the fact that “the trial court did not give proper consideration of the defendant’s
alcoholic problem, the part it played in causing the defendant to commit the crime and the
suggested alternatives for treating the problem.” Id. at 91. Additionally, the Idaho Supreme
Court has ruled that ingestion of drugs and alcohol resulting in impaired capacity to appreciate
criminality of conduct, could be a mitigating circumstance. State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414
(1981). Ms. Richardson realizes that she has struggled with her addiction to prescription pain
killers and heroin. (PSI, pp.14-15, 20.) However, Ms. Richardson wants treatment and her goal
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is to stay sober.

(3/2/18 Tr., p.20, Ls.9-20; PSI, pp.15-16, 26-27.)

At sentencing,

Ms. Richardson told the court that she wanted treatment for her drug addiction:
. . . I know I have a bad criminal history. I also have a very bad drug addiction.
I’ve been sober for almost five years until my son passed away. I feel you can see
from my history that the drugs -- you know, drug possessions, they stopped, the
petty thefts stopped. I was trying. I really was.
Like I said, the death of my son completely derailed me. I know I need help and I
know I need counseling, but I don’t think I deserve -- or not deserve, but I don’t
think I need to be in prison. I need programs in jail, definitely supervision. I need
supervision and I need to be told I need to do certain things.
(3/2/18 Tr., p.20, Ls.9-20.)
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires the trial
court to consider a defendant’s mental illness as a sentencing factor. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho
573, 581 (1999). Ms. Richardson reported a history of mental illness including bipolar disorder,
depression, anxiety, and PTSD. (3/2/18 Tr., p.14, Ls.5-6; R., p.47; PSI, pp.12-13, 33.) She has
taken medications to manage these mental health conditions. (3/2/18 Tr., p.14, Ls.5-9; PSI,
pp.12-13.) She believes she would benefit from counseling and medication to manage her
mental health conditions. (PSI, pp.12-13.)
Ms. Richardson enlisted in the United States Navy. (3/2/18 Tr., p.21, L.21; PSI, p.12.)
However, she was medically discharged due to mental health issues. (PSI, p.12.) In State v.
Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90 (1982), the court found the defendant’s honorable discharge from the
military to be a factor in mitigation of sentence.
Further, Ms. Richardson expressed remorse and accepted responsibility for her acts. At
sentencing, Ms. Richardson said:
I regretfully sit before you today and take accountability for my careless actions
that caused Ms. Harrison, my children and myself such grief. I feel it necessary to
share with you though what has partially caused my past behavior. I’m not just
my crimes. Very recently my 15-year old son,
passed away unexpectedly.
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This trauma has greatly impaired my mental health, my way of thinking, my lifestyle choices and most greatly my sobriety. While I’m still dealing with the grief
and loss of my oldest child, I am working towards getting stabilized on my mental
health meds, seeking counseling, remaining sober and once again being a
productive member of society, which at one point in time I was.
(3/2/18 Tr., p.18, L.19 – p.19, L.7.) Idaho recognizes that some leniency is required when a
defendant expresses remorse for his conduct and accepts responsibility for his acts. State v.
Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991). For
example, in Alberts, the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that some leniency is required when the
defendant has expressed “remorse for his conduct, his recognition of his problem, his willingness
to accept treatment and other positive attributes of his character.” Alberts, 121 Idaho at 209. In
Shideler, Idaho Supreme Court ruled that the prospect of Shideler’s recovery from his poor
mental and physical health, which included mood swings, violent outbursts, and drug abuse,
coupled with his remorse for his actions, was so compelling that it outweighed the gravity of the
crimes of armed robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a crime. Shideler, 103 Idaho at 594-95. Therefore, the court reduced Shideler’s
sentence from an indeterminate term not to exceed twenty years to an indeterminate term not to
exceed twelve years. Id. at 593. Ms. Richardson’s circumstances are somewhat similar to the
facts of both Alberts and Shideler in that she recognizes that she has an addiction to controlled
substances, she wants treatment for her substance abuse, she has been diagnosed with mental
health conditions, and she showed considerable remorse for her actions.
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Ms. Richardson asserts that the district court
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon her. She asserts that had the
district court properly considered her mental health conditions, controlled substances addictions,
and her remorse, it would have imposed a less severe sentence.
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Richardson respectfully requests that this Court reduce her sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, she requests that her case be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 10th day of October, 2018.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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